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2247:baa6b987926720-Nov-2022 Zhidao HONG

Basic njs support.

2230:83b2d20d8f5c16-Sep-2022 Andrew Clayton

PHP: allowed to specify URLs without a trailing '/'.

Both @lucatacconi & @mwoodpatrick reported what appears to be the same
issue on GitHub. Namely that when using the PHP language module and
trying

PHP: allowed to specify URLs without a trailing '/'.

Both @lucatacconi & @mwoodpatrick reported what appears to be the same
issue on GitHub. Namely that when using the PHP language module and
trying to access a URL that is a directory but without specifying the
trailing '/', they were getting a '503 Service Unavailable' error.

Note: This is when _not_ using the 'script' option.

E.g with the following config

{
"listeners": {
"[::1]:8080": {
"pass": "applications/php"
}
},

"applications": {
"php": {
"type": "php",
"root": "/var/tmp/unit-php"
}
}
}

and with a directory path of /var/tmp/unit-php/foo containing an
index.php, you would see the following

$ curl http://localhost/foo
<title>Error 503</title>
Error 503

However

$ curl http://localhost/foo/

would work and serve up the index.php

This commit fixes the above so you get the desired behaviour without
specifying the trailing '/' by doing the following

1] If the URL doesn't end in .php and doesn't have a trailing '/'
then check if the requested path is a directory.

2) If it is a directory then create a 301 re-direct pointing to it.
This matches the behaviour of the likes of nginx, Apache and
lighttpd.

This also matches the behaviour of the "share" action in Unit.

This doesn't effect the behaviour of the 'script' option which bypasses
the nxt_php_dynamic_request() function.

This also adds a couple of tests to test/test_php_application.py to
ensure this continues to work.

Closes: <https://github.com/nginx/unit/issues/717>
Closes: <https://github.com/nginx/unit/issues/753>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>

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2224:478701bc670618-Nov-2021 Remi Collet

TLS: Using ERR_get_error_all() with OpenSSL 3.

Link: <https://www.openssl.org/docs/man3.0/man7/migration_guide.html>
Cc: Andy Postnikov <apostnikov@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com

TLS: Using ERR_get_error_all() with OpenSSL 3.

Link: <https://www.openssl.org/docs/man3.0/man7/migration_guide.html>
Cc: Andy Postnikov <apostnikov@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
Signed-off-by: Remi Collet <remi@remirepo.net>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com>

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2223:1019031754fe16-Jan-2019 Remi Collet

Preferring system crypto policy.

If we don't call SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(), then it uses the
system's default.

Link: <https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/CryptoPolicy>
Link: <https://docs.fedor

Preferring system crypto policy.

If we don't call SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(), then it uses the
system's default.

Link: <https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/CryptoPolicy>
Link: <https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/CryptoPolicies/>
Link: <https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/consistent-security-crypto-policies-red-hat-enterprise-linux-8>
Signed-off-by: Remi Collet <remi@remirepo.net>
Acked-by: Andrei Belov <defan@nginx.com>
[ alx: add changelog and tweak commit message ]
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com>

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2221:667ee7489a0019-Oct-2022 Zhidao HONG

Configuration: added the regex status in configure summary.

2220:b57b4749b99314-Oct-2022 Zhidao HONG

Configuration: stopped automatic migration to the "share" behavior.

This commit removed the $uri auto-append for the "share" option
introduced in rev be6409cdb028.

The main reason is that it causes

Configuration: stopped automatic migration to the "share" behavior.

This commit removed the $uri auto-append for the "share" option
introduced in rev be6409cdb028.

The main reason is that it causes problems when preparing Unit configurations
to be loaded at startup from the state directory. E.g. Docker. A valid conf.json
file with $uri references will end up with $uri$uri due to the auto-append.

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2218:ed81ed291d0b02-Jun-2022 Remi Collet

PHP: Fixed php_module_startup() call for PHP 8.2.

PHP 8.2 changed the prototype of the function, removing the last
parameter.

Signed-off-by: Remi Collet <remi@remirepo.net>
Cc: Timo Stark <t.stark@

PHP: Fixed php_module_startup() call for PHP 8.2.

PHP 8.2 changed the prototype of the function, removing the last
parameter.

Signed-off-by: Remi Collet <remi@remirepo.net>
Cc: Timo Stark <t.stark@nginx.com>
Cc: George Peter Banyard <girgias@php.net>
Tested-by: Andy Postnikov <apostnikov@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Andy Postnikov <apostnikov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com>

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2217:8019e6c650f610-Sep-2022 Alex Colomar

Added missing error checking in the C API.

pthread_mutex_init(3) may fail for several reasons, and failing to
check will cause Undefined Behavior when those errors happen. Add
missing checks, and c

Added missing error checking in the C API.

pthread_mutex_init(3) may fail for several reasons, and failing to
check will cause Undefined Behavior when those errors happen. Add
missing checks, and correctly deinitialize previously created
stuff before exiting from the API.

Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhidao HONG <z.hong@f5.com>

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2214:49d502e96cec12-Oct-2022 Zhidao HONG

HTTP: added a $request_time variable.

2209:8a3994540aa828-Sep-2022 Zhidao HONG

Ruby: added support for rack V3.

Ruby applications would fail to start if they were using rack v3

2022/09/28 15:48:46 [alert] 0#80912 [unit] Ruby: Failed to parse rack script
2022/09/28 15:48:4

Ruby: added support for rack V3.

Ruby applications would fail to start if they were using rack v3

2022/09/28 15:48:46 [alert] 0#80912 [unit] Ruby: Failed to parse rack script
2022/09/28 15:48:46 [notice] 80911#80911 app process 80912 exited with code 1

This was due to a change in the rack API

Rack V2

def self.load_file(path, opts = Server::Options.new)
...
cfgfile.sub!(/^__END__\n.*\Z/m, '')
app = new_from_string cfgfile, path

return app, options
end

Rack V3

def self.load_file(path)
...

return new_from_string(config, path)
end

This patch handles _both_ the above APIs by correctly handling the cases
where we do and don't get an array returned from
nxt_ruby_rack_parse_script().

Closes: <https://github.com/nginx/unit/issues/755>
Tested-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
[ Andrew: Patch by Zhidao, commit message by me with input from Zhidao ]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>

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2204:654ec7adbe4f21-Sep-2022 Zhidao HONG

Status: fixed error in connection statistics.

When proxy is used, the number of accepted connections is not counted,
This also results in the wrong number of active connections.

2203:6b6b979e821418-Sep-2022 Zhidao HONG

HTTP: fixed cookie parsing.

The fixing supports the cookie value with the '=' character.

This is related to #756 PR on Github.
Thanks to changxiaocui.

2202:29b3edfb613d19-Sep-2022 Andrei Zeliankou

Version bump.

Revision tags: 1.28.0-1, 1.28.0
2197:a9ac98dad10513-Sep-2022 Andrei Zeliankou

Added version 1.28.0 CHANGES.

2196:7009706269f013-Sep-2022 Andrei Zeliankou

Reordered changes for 1.28.0 by significance (subjective).

2195:8dee71bcf84e12-Sep-2022 Andrei Zeliankou

Capitalize "HTTP" in "changes.xml" to match common style.

2194:0bce50b93a6a09-Sep-2022 Alex Colomar

Fixed a mutex leak in the C API.

In nxt_unit_create() we could leak a mutex created in
nxt_unit_ctx_init().

This could happen if nxt_unit_ctx_init() succeeded but later on we
bailed out of nxt_unit

Fixed a mutex leak in the C API.

In nxt_unit_create() we could leak a mutex created in
nxt_unit_ctx_init().

This could happen if nxt_unit_ctx_init() succeeded but later on we
bailed out of nxt_unit_create(), we would destroy the mutex created in
nxt_unit_create() but not the one created in nxt_unit_ctx_init().

Reorder things so that we do the call to nxt_unit_create() after all the
other checks so if it fails we don't leak the mutex it created.

Co-developed-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@f5.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@f5.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Colomar <a.colomar@f5.com>

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2188:a23ce83e19dd05-Sep-2022 Andrei Zeliankou

Fixed minor issues in "changes.xml".

2185:2227bdbb3c8929-Aug-2022 Valentin Bartenev

Implemented basic statistics API.

2184:3024bf4c5a3905-Sep-2022 Artem Konev

Updated the GitHub page banner.

2183:5f7bba4cc96830-Aug-2022 Andrew Clayton

Ruby: prevented a segfault on receiving SIGINT (^C).

As was reported[0] by @travisbell on GitHub, if running unit from the
terminal in the foreground when hitting ^C to exit it, the ruby
application

Ruby: prevented a segfault on receiving SIGINT (^C).

As was reported[0] by @travisbell on GitHub, if running unit from the
terminal in the foreground when hitting ^C to exit it, the ruby
application processes would segfault if they were using threads.

It's not 100% clear where the actual problem lies, but it _looks_ like
it may be in ruby.

The simplest way to deal with this for now is to just ignore SIGINT in
the ruby application processes. Unit will still receive and handle it,
cleanly shutting everything down.

For people who want to handle SIGINT in their ruby application running
under unit they can still trap SIGINT and it will override the ignore.

[0]: https://github.com/nginx/unit/issues/562#issuecomment-1223229585

Closes: https://github.com/nginx/unit/issues/562

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2181:bb0bd4a8046428-Jul-2022 Alejandro Colomar

Disallowed abstract unix socket syntax in non-Linux systems.

The previous commit added/fixed support for abstract Unix domain sockets
on Linux with a leading '@' or '\0'. To be consistent in all pl

Disallowed abstract unix socket syntax in non-Linux systems.

The previous commit added/fixed support for abstract Unix domain sockets
on Linux with a leading '@' or '\0'. To be consistent in all platforms,
treat those prefixes as markers for abstract sockets in all platforms,
and fail if abstract sockets are not supported by the platform.

That will avoid mistakes when copying a config file from a Linux system
and using it in non-Linux, which would surprisingly create a normal socket.

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2179:8686f63a222828-Jul-2022 Alejandro Colomar

Fixed support for abstract Unix sockets.

Unix domain sockets are normally backed by files in the
filesystem. This has historically been problematic when closing
and opening again such sockets, sinc

Fixed support for abstract Unix sockets.

Unix domain sockets are normally backed by files in the
filesystem. This has historically been problematic when closing
and opening again such sockets, since SO_REUSEADDR is ignored for
Unix sockets (POSIX left the behavior of SO_REUSEADDR as
implementation-defined, and most --if not all-- implementations
decided to just ignore this flag).

Many solutions are available for this problem, but all of them
have important caveats:

- unlink(2) the file when it's not needed anymore.

This is not easy, because the process that controls the fd may
not be the same process that created the file, and may not have
file permissions to remove it.

Further solutions can be applied to that caveat:

- unlink(2) the file right after creation.

This will remove the pathname from the filesystem without
closing the socket (it will continue to live until the last fd
is closed). This is not useful for us, since we need the
pathname of the socket as its interface.

- chown(2) or chmod(2) the directory that contains the socket.

For removing a file from the filesystem, a process needs
write permissions in the containing directory. We could
put sockets in dummy directories that can be chown(2)ed to
nobody. This could be dangerous, though, as we don't control
the socket names. It is our users who configure the socket
name in their configuration, and so it's easy that they don't
understand the many implications of not chosing an appropriate
socket pathname. A user could unknowingly put the socket in a
directory that is not supposed to be owned by user nobody, and
if we blindly chown(2) or chmod(2) the directory, we could be
creating a big security hole.

- Ask the main process to remove the socket.

This would require a very complex communication mechanism with
the main process, which is not impossible, but let's avoid it
if there are simpler solutions.

- Give the child process the CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE capability.

That is one of the most powerful capabilities. A process with
that capability can be considered root for most practical
aspects. Even if the capability is disabled for most of the
lifetime of the process, there's a slight chance that a
malicious actor could activate it and then easily do serious
damage to the system.

- unlink(2) the file right before calling bind(2).

This is dangerous because another process (for example, another
running instance of unitd(8)), could be using the socket, and
removing the pathname from the filesystem would be problematic.
To do this correctly, a lot of checks should be added before the
actual unlink(2), which is error-prone, and difficult to do
correctly, and atomically.

- Use abstract-namespace Unix domain sockets.

This is the simplest solution, as it only requires accepting a
slightly different syntax (basically a @ prefix) for the socket
name, to transform it into a string starting with a null byte
('\0') that the kernel can understand. The patch is minimal.

Since abstract sockets live in an abstract namespace, they don't
create files in the filesystem, so there's no need to remove
them later. The kernel removes the name when the last fd to it
has been closed.

One caveat is that only Linux currently supports this kind of
Unix sockets. Of course, a solution to that could be to ask
other kernels to implement such a feature.

Another caveat is that filesystem permissions can't be used to
control access to the socket file (since, of course, there's no
file). Anyone knowing the socket name can access to it. The
only method to control access to it is by using
network_namespaces(7). Since in unitd(8) we're using 0666 file
sockets, abstract sockets should be no more insecure than that
(anyone can already read/write to the listener sockets).

- Ask the kernel to implement a simpler way to unlink(2) socket
files when they are not needed anymore. I've suggested that to
the <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org> mailing list, in:
<lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/0bc5f919-bcfd-8fd0-a16b-9f060088158a@gmail.com/T>

In this commit, I decided to go for the easiest/simplest solution,
which is abstract sockets. In fact, we already had partial
support. This commit only fixes some small bug in the existing
code so that abstract Unix sockets work:

- Don't chmod(2) the socket if it's an abstract one.

This fixes the creation of abstract sockets, but doesn't make them
usable, since we produce them with a trailing '\0' in their name.
That will be fixed in the following commit.

This closes #669 issue on GitHub.

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2174:a7fb5d8a959017-Feb-2022 Max Romanov

Fixing isolated process PID manipulation.

Registering an isolated PID in the global PID hash is wrong
because it can be duplicated. Isolated processes are stored only
in the children list until the

Fixing isolated process PID manipulation.

Registering an isolated PID in the global PID hash is wrong
because it can be duplicated. Isolated processes are stored only
in the children list until the response for the WHOAMI message is
processed and the global PID is discovered.

To remove isolated siblings, a pointer to the children list is
introduced in the nxt_process_init_t struct.

This closes #633 issue on GitHub.

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2173:b4797a4fcb2d04-Aug-2022 Alejandro Colomar

Put changes entry in the correct position.

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